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"Speak, Go Ahead, Speak, Speak"1 :
Chamber Of Commerce v. Brown's Effect on Employer
Speech Regarding Unionization
By Lauren Kadish*
I. INTRODUCTION
Unionization rates have drastically fallen in the public sector,
from 33% of American workers in 1955, to less than 8% today.2 For
years, labor law has provided businesses with statutory support of
employers' free speech regarding unionization efforts. Union
advocates blame the difficulties of expanding union membership on
businesses' improved skills in deterring workers from unionization
and the sheer intimidation of their position as the employer. Thus,
unions have turned their focus toward implementing procedures
making union organization easier in order to increase membership
and ultimately protect workers' freedom to freely choose
representation. Recent case law promotes employer rights to speak
freely and deter unionization; however, the question remains as to
how this will ultimately affect employees' free choice in regard to
unionization.
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was enacted in 1935
to establish federal guidelines regarding the relationship between
labor unions and management and to provide uniform federal
regulations of employer conduct.3 The Act only imposed strict
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, Pepperdine University School of Law; B.M., Vocal
Performance, and B.A., German Language, The Catholic University of America,
2005.
1. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 128 S.
Ct. 2408 (2008) (No. 06-939).
2. See Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members in 2008 (Jan.
28, 2009), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm.
3 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
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regulations on employers and their ability to speak on unionization,
but contained no provisions forbidding unfair labor practices of
unions. 4 Thus, Congress passed the Labor Management Relations
Act (LMRA) in 1947 as a reaction to the growing imbalance of
power.5 The amended NLRA implemented the congressional intent
to encourage free debate on issues regarding organized labor and
management. 6 Furthermore, section 8(c) of the NLRA expressly
guaranteed the employer the right to speak freely in discouraging
union representation, as long as the speech was noncoercive. 7
In recent years, legislation regulating an employer's use of state
funds to assist or deter union organization at the state and local level
has become very popular with unions attempting to curtail employer
speech in opposition to unionization. Responding to a decline in
union membership, lack of enforcement of NLRA provisions by the
National Labor Relations Board, and apparent inefficiency of the
NLRA to protect workers' basic rights, organized labor has focused
its efforts on enacting state and local legislation to supplement
regulation where federal law is silent. As a result, the question has
been raised in the courts as to whether or not this legislation is
preempted by the NLRA.
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari on the
issue of whether a California statute (AB 1889) restricting the speech
of employers receiving state funds was preempted by the NLRA.8
The NLRA preempts state regulation interfering with Congress'
intention that certain activities be left to the free play of economic
forces. The Supreme Court's ultimate decision, analyzed further in
Part IV, reinforces the NLRA's preemptive power over state
regulation of employer speech. The Court's decision will also have a
profound impact on organized labor's recent efforts to ease the path
to unionization.
This case note examines the analysis of the Supreme Court's
holding in Chamber of Commerce. v. Brown and the effect the
decision will have on the rights of employers to engage in
4. Id.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 141.
6. S. REP. No. 74-573, at 2312 (1935).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2000); NLRB v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469,
477 (1941).
8. Chamber of Commerce, 128 S. Ct. at 2408.
noncoercive speech regarding unionization. Part II discusses the
historical lineage of employer free speech guaranteed under the
NLRA. Part III denotes the relevant facts and procedural history of
the case and issues presented to the Supreme Court. Part IV analyzes
both the majority and dissenting opinions regarding NLRA
preemption over state regulations prohibiting the expenditure of state
funds by employers to deter union organization. Finally, Part V
considers the effect this Court's decision will have on unions'
legislative initiatives to curtail employer speech and the practical
implications of allowing or limiting employer speech regarding
representation elections and organization.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The NLRA was enacted in 1935 to alleviate obstructions to the
free flow of commerce "by encouraging the practice .. of collective
bargaining and by protecting the exercise . . . of full freedom of
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of
their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and
conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection." 9
The NLRA, also known as "The Wagner Act," created a federal
agency, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), to have
exclusive jurisdiction over controversies that are within the
provisions of the NLRA and related to protecting concerted activities
and preventing unfair labor practices.1l Sections 7 and 8 of the
NLRA provide uniform federal regulation of the relationship between
labor unions and management. 1
Sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA are "designed to protect and
establish the basic rights incidental to collective bargaining. ' 12
9. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 153 (2000). The NLRB was created to carry out the purposes
Congress declared in sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA, eliminating obstructions to the
free flow of commerce by encouraging collective bargaining and protecting
employee's rights to negotiate terms of their employment by associating and
organizing with other employees. NLRB v. Wash., Va. & Md. Coach Co., 85 F.2d
990 (4th Cir. 1936), aff'd 301 U.S. 142 (1937). See also Balt. Sun Co. v. NLRB,
257 F.3d 419 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that the NLRB has the power to define the
representative appropriate to the unit for collective bargaining).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 151.
12. S. REP. No. 74-578, at 2308 (1935).
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Section 7 provides that workers have the right to join or form unions,
bargain collectively with employers about terms and conditions of
employment, and work in concert with other employees in order to
achieve employment-related goals.' 3 Section 8 makes it an "unfair
labor practice" for employers to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees" who are exercising their rights guaranteed by section 7.14
To determine whether conduct of an employer constitutes an unfair
labor practice, the NLRB looks to the relevant facts and
circumstances of the particular case. 15  Generally, to establish a
violation of section 7 rights, the NLRB must find the employer's
actions intimidating to a reasonable employee. 
1 6
The NLRB, created under the NLRA to strictly regulate
employers, decided that employer speech about unionization
amounted to a form of coercion precluded by section 8 of the
NLRA. 7  Even though the Supreme Court decided in NLRB v.
Virginia Electric & Power Co. that an employer was not prohibited
13. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).
15. See NLRB v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584, 599-600 (1941) (finding that
the free choice of the employee was obstructed by the employer's failure to
announce impartiality, delay in advising supervisors to remain neutral until the
union obtained majority, past union policy, and favorable treatment of the union,
thus amounting to interference with fair union organization); NLRB v. Ill. Tool
Works, 153 F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1946) (holding that an employer whose assistant
factory manager questioned employees about union membership, whose assistant
foreman told employees to stop talking to the union, and whose factory manager
was only discussing complaints with individuals not involved in a union engaged in
unfair labor practices in violation of the NLRA); NLRB v. Am. Furnace Co., 158
F.2d 376, 379 (7th Cir. 1946) (employer's approval of mayor's speech on
employer's premises during work hours discouraging union organization violated
the NLRA as an unfair labor practice).
16. See Ill. Tool Works, 153 F.2d at 814-16 (holding that the test of employer's
interference, restraint, and coercion of employees engaging in union activities is
not the motive, success, or failure of the action, but whether the employer engaged
in conduct that a reasonable employee would find to interfere with their rights to
engage in union activities); NLRB v. William Davies Co., 135 F.2d 179, 181 (7th
Cir. 1943) ("[t]he slightest interference, intimidation or coercion by the employer
of the employees in the rights guaranteed to the employees by the statute
constitutes an unfair labor practice in violation of Section 8(1) of the Act.").
17. See William Davies Co., 135 F.2d at 181.
from expressing noncoercive views on labor issues,18 there were no
provisions recognizing abuse on the part of unions or forbidding
unfair labor practices of unions. 9 In other words, the NLRA
provided protection to the employee against unfair actions by his
employer, but there were no protections against similar actions by a
labor organization, making the Act biased toward organized labor.
As a result, Congress amended the NLRA by enacting the Labor
Management Relations Act (LMRA) in 1947 to set forth additional
policies affording protections to employers and additional protections
to employees. 20
In the context of unfair labor practices, the LMRA amended
sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA to protect the rights of workers to join
or not to join a union, outlined additional restrictions on unions, and
guaranteed employers and employees the right to engage in
noncoercive speech about unionization. 21  Specifically, section
158(c) of the LMRA provides that:
[t]he express[ion] of any views, argument, or
opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in
written, printed, graphic or visual form, shall not
constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice
under any of the provisions of this subchapter, if such
18. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. at 477. The NLRA does not enjoin "the
employer from expressing its views on labor policies or problems," provided the
speech does not amount to coercion within the meaning of the NLRA. Id. This
holding recognizes the employer's First Amendment rights to noncoercive speech
in regard to unionization. Id.
19. See NLRB v. Schwartz, 146 F.2d 773, 774 (5th Cir. 1945) (finding that
contrary to a general misconception, the NLRA was originally intended to grant
"rights to the employee rather than... grant[ing] ... power to the union.").
20. 29 U.S.C. § 141 (2000). The LMRA amended the NLRA to (1) exclude
supervisors from the definition of "employee;" (2) separate prosecutorial and
adjudicatory powers of the NLRB by appointing an independent General Counsel;
(3) guaranteeing employees the right to refrain from union activities; (4)
proscribing certain activities of unions as unfair labor practices; and (5)
guaranteeing employers rights of free speech. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3), 153(d),
157, 158(b), and 158(c).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)-(c).
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expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or
promise of benefit.
22
To some extent, the LMRA may be viewed in part as a
codification of the Court's holding in Virginia Electric, where the
Supreme Court held that the NLRA allows an employer to exercise
its right of free speech under the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution, provided the speech is noncoercive and does not
amount to intimidation. 23 This section "merely implements the First
Amendment" by requiring that statements cannot be used as evidence
of an unfair labor practice if they do not interfere, restrain, or coerce
employees in their determination of self-organization.24
Additionally, the amendment to section 8 of the NLRA
implemented a congressional intent to encourage free debate on
issues regarding labor and management.25 Even those opposed to the
provision did not take issue with the basic idea of free speech
rights, 26 opposing only the fact that there is no other field of law that
22. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c). Under the ruling in Virginia Electric, the Supreme
Court made it clear that the NLRB has the right to look at both what an employer
has said and done to determine whether it interfered with the employee's selection
of representation. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. at 477-78. The wording in the
amendment to 29 U.S.C. § 158 indicates that this section is not designed to serve
the interest of free debate by immunizing all statements made during negotiations
or labor debates. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c). Instead, section 8(c) provides that the
expression of views will not be evidence of unfair labor practices if it does not
contain a threat of "reprisal or force or promise of benefit." Id. This wording
makes it more likely that Congress adopted the section for a more narrow purpose
like preventing the NLRB from attributing an anti-union motive to an employer
because of previous or past statements made without threat of retaliation. See H.R.
REP. No. 80-510, at 1135 (1947).
23. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. at 477.
24. SeeNLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617-618 (1969).
25. S. REP. No. 74-573, at 2312 (1935). "It must be stressed that the duty to
bargain collectively does not carry with it the duty to reach an agreement, because
the essence of collective bargaining is that either party shall be free to decide
whether proposals made to it are satisfactory." Id.
26. H.R. REP. No. 80-245, at 114 (1947) (Suppl. Minority Rep. by Hon. John
F. Kennedy). Opponent Representative John F. Kennedy, declared that "there
should be a readjustment of the collective-bargaining processes so that collective
bargaining will be really free and equal and in good faith on both sides." Id.
excludes statements "as evidence of an illegal intention." 27  By
choosing to amend the NLRA, rather than leave the issue open to the
courts to decide on a case-by-case basis, Congress indicated the
importance of leaving labor and management dispute issues open to
free debate.28
In 2000, the California legislature enacted AB 1889 to curb the
growing problem of aggressive anti-union campaigns being financed
with taxpayer money throughout the state.2 9 The bill fundamentally
prohibited employers receiving a certain amount of state funding
from using the state money to "assist, promote, or deter union
organizing. '"30 Essentially, the statutory language, "assist, promote,
or deter" was defined as "any attempt by an employer to influence
the decision of its employees in this state or those of its
subcontractors regarding . . . (1) [w]hether to support or oppose a
labor organization that represents or seeks to represent those
employees . .. [or] (2) [w]hether to become a member of any labor
organization. ' 31 This regulation applied to private employers
receiving over ten thousand dollars in state funds in any given year,
any employer receiving a state contract for over fifty thousand
dollars, and any private employers who are recipients of state
grants. 32  Additionally, all employers were prohibited from using
businesses located on state property to hold meetings addressing
unionization, and state contractors cannot assist, deter, or promote
union organization by employees who are performing work on state
contracts. 33 Litigation opportunities were increased by providing for
27. Id. at 84-85.
28. See Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 62-63 (1966) ("the
most repulsive speech enjoys immunity provided it falls short of a deliberate or
reckless untruth."). Debate on public issues should remain uninhibited and wide-
open. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
29. See Cal. Bill Analysis, Senate Floor, 1999-2000 Regular Session,
Assembly Bill 1889 (Aug. 25, 2000).
30. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 16645.1(a) (2009).
31. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 16645(a).
32. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 16645.7(a).
33. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 16645.3, 16645.5. Employers have to certify that no
state funds are used for prohibited expenditures and provide on request sufficient
records detailing their expenditures. Id. If any state funds are commingled with
other funds, then "any expenditures to assist, promote, or deter union organizing
Sveak, Go Ahead, Speak, SpeakSpring 2009
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dual enforcement, allowing both a civil action by the attorney general
or by an individual taxpayer. 34  In addition, penalties for
noncompliance by the employer were also increased.35
Supporters viewed the bill as providing state neutrality in the area
of union organization.36 Realizing that a neutrality bill would not
completely dissolve anti-union campaigns, the supporters of the
legislation were at least assured that the bill would keep campaigns
from being funded with state funds.37 The bill did not require
employers to remain entirely neutral during organizational
campaigns; it just required them to use personal funds in the
opposition or promotion of unions. 38 If the state allowed employers
to use state money to oppose union organization, then the state would
be viewed as choosing sides in private labor disputes; therefore,
supporters viewed this bill as providing state neutrality, rather than
employer neutrality. 39
shall be allocated between state funds and other funds on a pro rata basis." CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 16646(b).
34. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 16645.8(a).
35. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 16645.2(d). Penalties for violations are harsh, and a
non-complying employer is liable to the state for the funds spent in violation of the
statute and a civil penalty equal to twice the amount of the funds used in violation.
Id. Additionally, prevailing plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees and costs in
order to encourage complaints to surface without fear of costly legal fees. CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 16645.8(d).
36. See JOHN LOGAN, INNOVATIONS IN STATE AND LOCAL LABOR
LEGISLATION: NEUTRALITY LAWS AND LABOR PEACE AGREEMENTS IN CALIFORNIA
160 (2003).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 162. Employers receiving state funds and incurring costs associated
with possible prohibited activity are required to maintain sufficient financial
records showing the costs were not paid by or reimbursed by state funds. CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 16645.1(b) (2009). Fund recipients must "account for all monies
received, and certify that no prohibited activity occurred; if involved in such
activity, fund recipient must account separately for those expenditures." Cal. Bill
Analysis, Senate Floor, 1999-2000 Regular Session, Assembly Bill 1889 (Aug. 25,
2000).
39. Logan, supra note 36, at 160. AB 1889 was not promoted as "neutrality"
legislation requiring that employers remain entirely neutral during organizational
campaigns. Id. at 162. Supporters of the bill note that because employers are still
allowed to use private funds to launch anti-union campaigns, the statute enables the
state of California, not employers, to remain neutral in regard to labor-management
disputes. Id. By preventing the state from funding employers' opposition of
Those in opposition to the bill, primarily employers, viewed the
regulation as an infringement on the employer's constitutional right
of free speech that is protected by the amended section 8(c) of the
NLRA.40 Employers were required to maintain sufficient records to
prove that state funds were used properly, and opponents argued that
this would create a complex accounting system forcing employers
into remaining neutral in order to comply with AB 1889. 4 1
Regardless of the outlined opposition, however, the California
legislature enacted AB 1889 in September of 2000.42
unions, this bill kept the state neutral in private labor disputes. Id. In 1999,
California attempted to enact a state neutrality law, similar to AB 1889, but the
governor vetoed it because the requirements for record keeping potentially
"impose[d] an unreasonable burden" on corporations and increased employer
litigation costs by increasing the opportunities for employees to file civil actions.
Gray Davis, "AB 442: Veto Message" (1999). In response to the veto, supporters
of the bill removed some of the record keeping requirements, limited the
application of the bill, provided limitations on civil actions brought by potential
plaintiffs, and added language that state funds could not be used to "promote or
deter unionization." Logan, supra note 36, at 161. The employers in opposition to
AB 1889 claimed that it was virtually the same as the previous bill vetoed by the
governor and most importantly criticized the supposed neutrality of AB 1889
because of the additional limitations on employer speech in regard to unionization.
Id. Primarily, opponents saw the bill as being focused on curbing opposition to
unionization rather than the employer's support for unions. Id. AB 1889 was
proposed as a revised version of the attempted state neutrality law of 1999. Id.
40. Logan, supra note 36, at 163. Opponents argued that the real intention of
the bill was to eliminate employer opposition of union organization, which involves
a clear violation of the NLRA and a constitutional violation of the employer's First
Amendment rights of free speech. Id. Additionally, they argued that the true intent
was to mandate employer neutrality in order to increase unionization among
employees. Id. at 165.
41. Id. at 164. Employers argued that these additional requirements would
have an impact on business performance and a devastating impact on those
industries that are heavily reliant on the use of state funds. Id. Small businesses
that could not afford to keep up with the record keeping accounting requirements
would either go out of business or move out of the state to avoid these
requirements. Id.
42. Id. at 171. In the twenty months that AB 1889 was effective, there were
only twenty-four complaints filed by unions against employers alleging
misappropriation of state funds for prohibited activities, which greatly undermined
employers' opposition and claims that the bill would have a devastating effect on
California businesses. Id. Among the activities that these employers were accused
of engaging in was the hiring of consultants and law firms to direct anti-union
campaigns, paying supervisors to conduct mandatory anti-union meetings at the
Spring 2009 Speak, Go Ahead, Speak, Speak
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After the enactment of AB 1889, the question arose in the courts
as to whether or not this state legislation is preempted by federal
statute. The NLRA derives its general preemptive power from the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, providing that
all laws made in pursuance of the Constitution are the supreme law of
the land and judges in state courts will be bound by these federal
laws when faced with contrary state laws.43 A prerequisite to
preemption is a "finding that the state or local action in question
constitutes regulation of labor relations between employers and
employees" because the NLRA does not preempt statutes where the
state is acting as a mere proprietor or market participant.44 Provided
the court finds that the state is acting in a regulatory capacity and the
exercise of state power over a particular area or activity interferes
with or contrasts with the policies embodied in the NLRA, the United
States Constitution may preclude the respective state law.
Sometimes the congressional intent of federal preemption is stated
within in the statutory language of the federal law; however, the
NLRA does not explicitly contain a preemption provision. Thus, the
Supreme Court has interpreted the NLRA and its corresponding
congressional intent to give rise to two preemption principles,
workplace, and creating and distributing anti-union literature. Id. The complaints
alleged that the employer was a recipient of state funds, had engaged in the
prohibited activities, and did not maintain sufficient accounts to demonstrate they
were in fact complying with AB 1889. Id. However, very few of these complaints
were actually investigated by the attorney general. Id. at 176.
43. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
44. See Alameda Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Oakland, 95 F.3d 1406, 1413
(9th Cir. 1996); Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of the Metro. Dist. v. Associated
Builders & Contractors of Mass./R.I., Inc. (Boston Harbor), 507 U.S. 218, 227
(1993). While there is not a formal rule for applying the market participant
exception, two Supreme Court cases have helped to define the scope of the
exception. See Wisc. Dep't. of Indus. Labor and Human Relations v. Gould, Inc.,
475 U.S. 282 (1986) (a Wisconsin statute regulated spending powers by providing
additional remedies for violations of the NLRA and the state was held to be acting
in a regulatory capacity and not privy to the market participant exception); Boston
Harbor, 507 U.S. at 227 (state agency acted as a market participant when requiring
contractors to agree to specific terms of a project labor agreement because the
government was motivated purely by proprietary interests). When a state uses its
spending power to shape the overall labor market in a regulatory manner, the
market participation exception will not apply and the state action may be subject to
NLRA preemption. Chamber of Commerce v. Lockyer, 364 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.
2004) reh 'g granted and withdrawn, 408 F.3d 590 (9th Cir. 2005).
Garmon preemption doctrine 45  and Machinists preemption
doctrine. 46
In Garmon, the court reasoned that by enacting the amendments
of the LMRA, Congress did not exhaust the full sweep of legislative
power over industrial relations; instead, it created a code outlawing
some aspects of labor activities and leaving others "free for the
operation of economic forces.",47 The Machinists doctrine precludes
state and municipal regulation in regard to these areas that Congress
intended to be left unregulated.48 Under this ruling, the Supreme
45. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). This
decision precludes state and municipalities from regulating activity that is already
protected or prohibited by the NLRA. Id. at 235. The aim of the Garmon test of
preemption is to provide a uniform federal law governing labor relation issues
under the regulation of a single agency, the NLRB. See Golden State Transit Corp.
v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 613 (1986) (holding that "[t]he Garmon rule
is intended to preclude state interference with the [NLRB]'s interpretation and
active enforcement . [of] the NLRA."). This broad test excludes state laws even
where the terms of the state laws are consistent with that of the NLRA. See Gould,
475 U.S. at 282 (state law barring individuals or businesses found to violate the
NLRA on three or more occasions in the preceding five years from doing business
with the state was preempted by federal law). More importantly, preemption will
result if state regulation significantly affects NLRA rights or procedures, bans
conduct permitted by the NLRA, or interferes with the NLRB's jurisdiction. See
Youngdahl v. Rainfair Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957) (holding that a state court may
enjoin violence on a picket line, but it is preempted from enjoining peaceful
picketing that is protected under the provisions of the NLRA); Sears, Roebuck, &
Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978)
(holding that a state court trespass action to enjoin picketing on private property
may be preempted where the NLRB has jurisdiction to decide whether the content
of the picketing is protected by the NLRA and is thus an unfair labor practice).
46. Int'l Assoc. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wis. Employment
Relations Comm. (Machinists), 427 U.S. 132, 134 (1976).
47. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 240. Under Garmon, the federal statute does not
preempt state regulation of activity that does not go to the heart of the regulations
or purposes served by the NLRA. Id. at 243-44.
48. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 134. In this case, an employer filed a charge with
the NLRB claiming that union members' refusal to work overtime during
negotiations for the renewal of their collective bargaining agreements constitutes an
unfair labor practice. Id. at 135. Because the claim was dismissed on the ground
that it did not violate the NLRA and was not enforceable by the NLRB, the
employer filed a complaint with the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission
that issued an order against the union to cease their concerted refusal to work
overtime. Id. at 135-36. The Supreme Court held that the union's activity was
peaceful conduct that must be free of state regulation because it conflicts with the
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Court held that a state cannot regulate conduct, as long as it is within
the zone of activity that Congress intended to leave open to the free
market. 49 The Machinists preemption doctrine is limited and does
not preempt state action when it is in the nature of "market
participation." 50  The primary application of this preemption
principle arises when the state issues a regulation of economic
weapons used by the parties involved in a labor dispute.5 1 Allowing
congressional intent that self-help economic activities, of either the employer or the
employee, are not to be regulated by the NLRB or the states. Id. at 155. Neither
the states nor the NLRA have the authority to attempt to introduce a balanced
standard of bargaining power or define the economic functions permitted in
negotiating for or against collective bargaining. Id. at 132. See also NLRB v.
Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. 477, 498-500 (1960).
49. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 155. See also Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. at 488-
89 (holding that a particular activity might be protected by federal law when it falls
under section 7 and when it is an activity Congress intended to be "unrestricted by
any governmental power to regulate."); Hanna Mining Co. v. Marine Eng'rs, 382
U.S. 181, 187 (1965) ("[T]he legislative purpose may dictate that certain
activity 'neither protected nor prohibited' be deemed privileged against state
regulation . ").
50. See Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. at 227. A state does not only regulate within
the areas protected by the NLRA, and when a state owns and manages property,
they must interact with private participants in the marketplace. Id. In Gould, the
court was faced with a state agency's attempt to compel conformity with the NLRA
by not allowing individuals who had violated provisions of the NLRA within the
past five years from doing business with the state. Gould, 475 U.S. at 289-90. The
court held that the state was not functioning as a private purchaser of services or
goods, and thus its actions amounted to regulation and preempted by the NLRA.
Id. at 290. The Supreme Court ruled that a state may take action without offending
the preemption principles of the NLRA if it is acting as a proprietor and the
conduct does not amount to regulation or policy making. Boston Harbor, 507 U.S.
at 229-30.
51. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 141. Certain activity that is neither protected nor
prohibited under the NLRA may also be privileged against state regulation because
it is a permissible "economic weapon in reserve .... actual exercise (of which) on
occasion by the parties, is part and parcel of the system that the Wagner and Taft-
Hartley Acts have recognized." Id. (quoting Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. at 488-
89). Courts have invoked the Machinists preemption to strike down state
regulation of work slowdowns, the hiring of replacement workers, and a party's
refusal to agree to bargaining demands. See Employer's Ass'n v. United
Steelworkers, 32 F.3d 1297 (8th Cir. 1994) (ruling that state law prohibiting the
hiring of permanent replacements to fill positions left empty by strikers was
preempted); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608
(1986) (holding that a city council resolution requiring a taxi company franchise to
both the employer and employee to properly employ economic
weapons is an integral part of the effort to achieve bargaining goals
and part of the balance struck by Congress "between the uncontrolled
power of management and labor to further their respective
interests. 52  Thus, provided a state is acting in its capacity as a
regulator and the proposed regulation concerns issues intended by
Congress to be unregulated in the promotion of the free play of
economics, the state regulation should be preempted by the NLRA
under the Machinists theory.
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE
In April 2002, several organizations involved in business with the
State of California (collectively, Chamber of Commerce) brought suit
in the United States District Court for the Central District of
California against the California Department of Health Services and
several state officials, including Attorney General Bill Lockyer, to
prevent the enforcement of AB 1889. 53  Two labor unions, the
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations (AFL-CIO) and California Labor Federal, intervened
to defend the validity of AB 1889. 54 Plaintiffs filed a motion for
summary judgment arguing that AB 1889 was both unconstitutional
under federal and state constitutions and preempted by the NLRA. 55
Based on the Supreme Court's holding in Linn v. United Plant Guard
Workers of America56 that the enactment of NLRA section 8(c)
marked a "congressional intent to encourage free debate on issues
dividing labor and management," the District Court found that AB
end its strike and adopt a labor agreement in order to renew its franchise was
preempted).
52. Local 20, Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Union v. Morton, 377 U.S.
252, 258-59 (1964).
53. Chamber of Commerce v. Lockyer (Lockyer 1), 225 F. Supp. 2d 1199,
1201 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of Am., Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 62
(1966).
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1889 was preempted by the NLRA because it would prevent free
debate.57 Plaintiff s motion for summary judgment was granted.58
Defendants appealed the District Court's grant of summary
judgment to the Ninth Circuit in April of 2004.59 The initial panel
affirmed the District Court's ruling that AB 1889 was preempted
under the Machinists doctrine because "California - acting as a
regulator, not a proprietor in imposing these restrictions - has acted
in such a way as to undermine federal labor policy by altering
Congress' design for the collective bargaining process." 60  The
language of the statute was found by this panel to regulate "the union
organizing process itself and [impose] substantial compliance costs
and litigation risk on employers who participate in that process," thus
57. Lockyer I, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 1204-05. Parties did not dispute that the
definition of "assist, promote or deter union organizing" included "attempts by the
employer to influence employee decisions through speech" while the employer is
being compensated by state funds or on state property. Id. The court held that AB
1889 is preempted because by definition it regulated employer speech about union
organization, an area that Congress intended to leave open to free debate. Id.
58. Id. at 1201.
59. Chamber of Commerce v. Lockyer (Lockyer II), 364 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.
2004) reh g granted and withdrawn, 408 F.3d 590 (9th Cir. 2005).
60. Id. at 1159. The prerequisite for a preemption analysis is a finding that the
statute constitutes regulation of labor relations between employers and employees,
as opposed to state action in the capacity of a mere proprietor or market participant.
See supra note 44 and accompanying text. This court used the Fifth Circuit's two-
prong test to determine whether the market exception applied to the State of
California in the enactment of AB 1889. Lockyer II, 364 F.3d at 1162 (citing
Cardinal Towing & Auto Repair, Inc. v. City of Bedford, 180 F.3d 686, 693 (5th
Cir. 1999)). The first prong looks at the nature of the expenditure to determine
whether the "action essentially reflect[s] the entity's own interest in the efficient
procurement of needed goods and services." Id. Here, AB 1889 did not reflect
California's interest in the procurement of goods and services, but rather prevented
"the state from influencing employee choice about whether to join a union." Id. at
1163. The second prong looks at the scope of the expenditure, where a narrow
scope will lean toward market participant and a broader social regulation will be
regulatory. Id. Here, the court held that the statute "sweeps broadly to shape
policy in the overall labor market" rather than addressing a specific proprietary
problem. Id. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that AB 1889 is a regulatory
measure that does not enjoy the protection of the market participant exception. Id.
interfering with an area that Congress intended to be left open to free
debate and preempted under the Machinists doctrine.6"
The Defendants' Petition for Panel Rehearing was granted by the
Ninth Circuit, withdrawing its previous panel opinion. 62  Upon
rehearing, the majority once more affirmed the District Court's
holding that the NLRA preempts AB 1889, but the decision rested on
slightly different grounds than the vacated panel decision. 63  The
majority concluded that the California statute undermined employer
speech rights by compelling employers to take a position of neutrality
with respect to labor relations. 64 Requiring an employer to remain
61. Id. at 1165. State regulation is preempted by the NLRA if it "directly
targets and substantially affects open employer discussion about unionization, even
if such regulation comes in the form of a restriction on the use of state funds." Id.
at 1167. The Ninth Circuit determined that this California statute had the explicit
purpose of interfering with the NLRA's established system for organizing labor
unions. Id. at 1168. The ability of labor and management to openly advocate for
or against union organization is an element of the collective bargaining process and
explicitly outlined in section 8(c) of the NLRA. Id. at 1165. Thus, because AB
1889 interferes with the collective bargaining process outlined and protected by the
NLRA, the California law is preempted under the Machinist doctrine. Id. at 1166.
62. Lockyer II, 364 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), reh 'g granted and withdrawn,
408 F.3d 590 (9th Cir. 2005). A petition for rehearing may be filed under the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 40(a). FED. R. APP. P. 40(a) (2009). If
a timely petition for rehearing is not filed in the court of appeals, then the party
cannot re-raise matters previously decided at the district court level on subsequent
appeal. Id.; see also United States v. Gargotto, 510 F.2d 409, 412 (6th Cir. 1975).
The purpose of a petition for rehearing is to ensure that the panel properly
considered all relevant information in rendering its decision. See Armster v. U.S.
Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 806 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1986).
63. Chamber of Commerce v. Lockyer (Lockyer 1ff), 422 F.3d 973, 977 (9th
Cir. 2005), reh 'g granted and withdrawn, 437 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2006).
64 Id. at 978. This court held that "the California statute chills employers from
exercising their free speech rights that are explicitly protected by Congress under
the [NLRA]... [which] undermines the delicate balance established by Congress
as between labor unions and employers." Id. at 976. This statute pushes employers
to implement neutrality, and in turn facilitates union organization. Id. at 978. The
majority notes that the statute's prohibition on spending state funds to "assist" or
"promote" the organization of unions is meaningless because an employer will
rarely spend funds encouraging its employees to join or create a union. Id.
Therefore, the primary effect of the statute is to prevent the expenditure of money
to "deter union organizing." Id. at 979. Creating compliance burdens, accounting
requirements, threat of lawsuits, and heavy penalties for non-compliance, AB 1889
effectively halts employer campaigns to defeat labor organization. Id. This is most
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neutral is in direct conflict with the NLRA, which explicitly grants
employers the right to "articulate, in a non-coercive manner, their
views regarding union organizing efforts" under section 8(c). 65 The
basis of preemption under this ruling was not only based on the
Machinists preemption doctrine, 66 but also the Garmon doctrine,
which asserts that conflicting state regulations do not apply where the
conduct is protected or prohibited by the NLRA.67  Garmon
obvious with employers receiving one hundred percent of their revenues from the
state because under AB 1889, they have "no ability whatsoever to exercise their
federal statutory rights to communicate their views about a union organizing
effort." Id. at 980.
65. Id. at 982 (footnote omitted). This court held that section 8(c) of the
NLRA "explicitly protects the right of employers to express their views about
unions and union organizing efforts." Id. Clearly expressing that a particular
activity is not punishable by the Act is essentially the equivalent of protecting the
activity under the Act. Id. at 983. Thus, because section 8(c) of the NLRA
declares noncoercive employer speech to be non-punishable, this type of employer
speech is protected under the regulatory scheme of the Act. Id. The Supreme
Court of the United States has held that section 8(c), along with the First
Amendment, allows an employer to express "any of [their] general views about
unionism or any of [their] specific views about a particular union" in a non-
coercive fashion. Id. (citing NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618
(1969)). Thus, the Ninth Circuit has adopted the Fifth Circuit's principle of free
speech on union representation matters and that "it is the employee who is to make
the choice and a free flow of information, the good and the bad, informs him as to
the choices available." NLRB v. TRW-Semiconductors, Inc., 385 F.2d 753, 760
(9th Cir. 1967) (quoting Southwire Co. v. NLRB, 383 F.2d 235, 241 (5th Cir.
1967)).
66. Lockyer I1, 422 F.3d at 988. The Machinists preemption doctrine is based
on the idea that neither the NLRB nor state regulation may determine which
specific economic devices of labor management are or are not lawful because
Congress intended to leave this area open to free debate. Id. Just as the initial
Ninth Circuit panel concluded, AB 1889 is preempted by the NLRA under this
doctrine because discouraging employers from exercising their protected speech
rights operates to disrupt the intentional balance between management and labor.
Id. at 989. "An essential structural component of the union organizing process as
established by the [NLRA] is the ability of management to communicate its views
on the merits of unionism, an attribute that AB 1889 disrupts." Id.
67. Id. at 985. The Supreme Court has held that there are three forms of
Garmon preemption, depending on the conduct that the state is attempting to
regulate: (1) conduct that is actually prohibited or protected by the NLRA; (2)
conduct that is arguably prohibited; or (3) conduct that is arguably protected by the
NLRA. Id.; see generally Sears, Roebuck & Co., 436 U.S. 180. The strongest form
of preemption is conduct that is actually prohibited or protected by the NLRA
preemption is intended to prevent state laws from interfering with the
NLRB's enforcement of the NLRA.6" The Ninth Circuit held that
AB 1889 "stifle[d] employers' speech rights which are granted by
federal law . . . imped[ing] the ability of the [NLRB] to uphold its
election speech rules and administer free and fair elections."'69 Judge
Fisher disagreed with the majority decision, and argued in dissent
that neither the Garmon nor Machinists preemption applied because
"California [was] not actually regulating the speech at issue .... "0
The Ninth Circuit's second panel opinion was then vacated and
withdrawn from publication for reconsideration en banc. 7' The en
banc panel reversed the District Court's grant of summary judgment
for the plaintiffs, holding that AB 1889 was not preempted by the
NLRA and did not interfere with an employer's First Amendment
because "[w]hen it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a
State purports to regulate are protected by [the NLRA,] due regard for the federal
enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield." Lockyer III, 422 F.3d 986
(quoting Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244).
68. Lockyer Il, 422 F.3d at 987. "AB 1889 encumbers federally protected
speech rights, and in doing so, interferes with the jurisdiction of the [NLRB]." Id.
at 986.
69. Lockyer III, 422 F.3d at 985. Congress directed the NLRB to regulate
employer speech and ensure compliance with section 8(c) of the NLRA. Id. at 987.
AB 1889, however, regulated and discouraged the partisan employer speech that
Congress explicitly placed within the jurisdiction of the NLRB. Id. This in turn
"directly usurps the ability of the [NLRB] to administer elections that will foster
fair and free employee choice." Id. This court held that Garmon preemption
applies because AB 1889 creates a "frustration of national purposes" and regulates
"conduct so plainly within the central aim of federal regulation." Id. at 988
(quoting Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244).
70. Id. at 995, see generally id. at 994-1006. Judge Fisher based his dissent on
his belief that "when a state restricts merely the use of state funds for a given
activity - without regulating an employer's ability to pursue that activity with its
own funds - the state is not directly regulating that activity." Id. at 995. Because
the dissent held that California is not actually regulating speech, Judge Fisher
concluded that AB 1889 was not preempted by the NLRA under either the Garmon
or Machinists doctrines. Id.
71. See Chamber of Commerce v. Lockyer, 437 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2006).
Rule 35(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure states that en banc hearing
or rehearing "is not favored" and that it ordinarily will be ordered only when "(1)
en banc consideration is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court's
decisions; or (2) the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance."
FED. R. APp. PROC. 35(a) (2007).
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right to express views on union organization.72  This court agreed
with the District Court and two previous panel opinions that
California acted as a regulator and the market participant exception
did not apply to preclude preemption.73 However, the en banc panel
did not agree with the previous courts' positions that AB 1889 was
preempted by either the Machinists or Garmon doctrines. 74  The
majority en banc opinion held that Machinist did not apply because
(1) restriction on the use of state funds does not intrude on conduct
meant to be left to the free play of economic forces, (2) Congress did
not leave this zone of activity free from all regulation, and (3) it
cannot be inferred that Congress intended the NLRA to deprive states
of the ability to impose restrictions on employer speech because
Congress itself passed similar federal laws. 75 The Garmon doctrine
72. Chamber of Commerce v. Lockyer (Lockyer IV), 463 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th
Cir. 2006) (en banc).
73. Id. at 1082-85.
74. Id. at 1085.
75. Id. at 1087-90. First, the en banc panel concluded that enacting a statute
that places spending restrictions only on the use of state funds does not impede on
"conduct meant to be left to the free play of economic forces . .." Id. at 1087.
Because the state's choice of how to spend their money is by definition not
controlled by economic forces, the court held that it cannot be Congress' intent to
leave this area unregulated. Id. By enacting AB 1889, California did not engage in
an attempt to use funds to alter employer-spending decisions. Id. Therefore, AB
1889's restrictions on the use of funds did not interfere with an employer's ability
to engage in "weapon[s] of self-help" left unregulated by the NLRA, and
"[e]mployers remain free to convey their views regarding unionization . .
provided only that they do not use state grant and program funds to do so." Id. at
1086, 1088. Second, the NLRB acknowledged that Machinists applies only to
areas left free from complete regulation. Id. at 1089. Organization and employer
speech within this context is not one of these areas, as indicated by the NLRB's
own extensive regulation of this area. Id.; NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324,
330 (1946) (giving the NLRB "a wide degree of discretion in establishing the
procedure and safeguards necessary to insure the fair and free choice of bargaining
representatives by employees"); see also Peoria Plastic Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 545,
547-48 (1957) (prohibiting interviews with employees immediately prior to an
election); Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427, 429 (1953) (barring employers
and unions from conducting election speeches on company time to employees
within 24 hours of election). Additionally, section 9 of the NLRA explicitly grants
the NLRB the ability to regulate conduct by employers and unions, including
speech, which is prejudicial to a fair election. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (2000). Finally, this
court concluded that because Congress had previously passed federal laws similar
to AB 1889, it cannot be inferred that Congress intended to deprive states of the
was also held inapplicable because the majority concluded that
section 8(c) did not grant any speech rights to employers and
therefore, "California's refusal to subsidize employer speech for or
against unionization [did] not regulate an activity that [was] actually
protected or actually prohibited by the NLRA."76 Thus, the Ninth
Circuit en banc panel concluded that AB 1889 was not preempted by
the NLRA.77 Three circuit judges dissented, finding that AB 1889
was preempted by the NLRA under the Machinists doctrine because
"it interferes with an area Congress intended to leave free of state
regulation" by "directly regulat[ing] the union organizing process
itself and impos[ing] substantial compliance costs and litigation risk
on employers who participate in that process using the statutorily
protected self-help mechanisms."7 8 Additionally, the dissent found
AB 1889 was preempted under the Garmon doctrine as well because
the California statute discouraged employer speech protected by
ability to pass these laws as well. Lockyer IV, 463 F.3d at 1090. The court noted
that the spending restrictions imposed by AB 1889 are modeled on those enacted
by Congress to prohibit "the use of federal funds to assist, promote, or deter
organizing." Id. at 1089.
76. Id. at 1092. This court held that section 8(c) of the NLRA carves out
noncoercive speech from activity that is punishable under the federal regulation;
however, this does not grant employers specific speech rights. Id. at 1091. Instead,
the en banc panel concluded that the NLRA simply "prohibits [employers']
noncoercive speech from being used as evidence of an unfair labor practice." Id.
Plaintiffs and the dissent argued that saying an activity is not punishable protects
that activity in effect. Id. The majority, however, found that there is no explicit or
affirmative grant of speech rights present in section 8(c); thus, California's
restrictions of employer speech did not interfere with an activity that is either
protected or prohibited by the NLRA. Id. at 1092.
77. Id. at 1098.
78. Id. at 1105 (Beezer, J., dissenting). Because the statute created a threat of
expensive litigation and extensive compliance costs, the dissent reasoned that the
California statute "ties the hands of management financially and allows pro-union
groups free reign." Id. As an example, Judge Beezer noted that AB 1889 allows
unions to bypass federal labor laws, providing that unions are only permitted to
receive an employer's financial records for legitimate collective bargaining
purposes after winning an election, because the unions can now file lawsuits in
state court under a violation of AB 1889, rendering employer's financial records
accessible. Id. at n.2. Once the unions have access to financial records, they have
"additional leverage in advocating for a unionized workforce and [can] place
additional pressure on an employer to simply recognize a given union." Id.
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section 8(c) and "directly usurp[ed] the ability of the NLRB to
administer elections that will foster fair and free employee choice." 79
In 2007, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of
whether the NLRA preempts AB 1889. On June 19, 2008, six years
after the beginning of litigation, the Court released its opinion. 80
Justice Stevens wrote for the majority, holding that AB 1889 was
preempted by the NLRA under the Machinists doctrine, reversing the
Ninth Circuit's en banc opinion, and Justice Breyer, joined by Justice
Ginsberg, issued a dissenting opinion. 81
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S OPINION
A. Justice Stevens' Majority Opinion
The majority held that AB 1889 is preempted under the
Machinists doctrine because it "regulate[s] within Ia zone protected
and reserved for market freedom."' 8 2 First, Justice Stevens discussed
the statutory language of the NLRA, holding that the section 8(c)
amendment indicates a policy judgment "favoring uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open debate in labor disputes. 83  Under the
79. Id. at 1107-08 (Beezer, J., dissenting). The majority opinion analyzed the
Garmon preemption doctrine as applying only where the controversy in state court
is identical to the controversy presented to the NLRB; however, Judge Beezer
stated that this requirement of identical controversies is only applicable when the
activity is arguably prohibited by the Act. Id. Here, the dissent reasoned that
section 8(c) of the NLRA explicitly protected employer's speech rights, so there is
not a requirement that the controversy be identical to that presented to the NLRB,
and the majority's reliance upon the holding in Sears is misplaced. Id. at 1109
(citing Sears, Roebuck & Co., 436 U.S. at 187). Therefore, because AB 1889
"interferes with [free speech rights of employers] and undermines the speech rules
and election procedures of the NLRB," the dissent would have held that the
California statute is preempted under the Garmon doctrine. Id.
80. Chamber of Commerce, 128 S. Ct. 2408 (2008). Note that Edmund G.
Brown, Jr. was elected to replace Bill Lockyer as Attorney General of California in
2007.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2412 (quoting Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. at 227). This court does not
further discuss preemption under the Garmon doctrine as previous Ninth Circuit
opinions.
83. Brown, 128 S. Ct. at 2414 (quoting Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264,
272-73 (1974)). The NLRA did not include a specific provision addressing the
Machinists preemption doctrine, congressional intent to leave a zone
of activity unregulated was generally found implicitly through the
inference that the areas left unregulated remain as important as the
imposed regulations. Therefore, because the majority found that the
NLRA contains both implicit and explicit direction from Congress to
leave noncoercive speech unregulated, the Supreme Court reasoned
that a state statute regulating this speech is preempted by the federal
Act.84 The majority held that to the extent AB 1889 "interfere[d]
with an employee's choice about whether to join or be represented by
a labor union, . . [AB 1889 is] unequivocally preempted."85
The majority opinion specifically declined to address AB 1889's
validity under the First Amendment because it found that the
question was "not whether AB 1889 violates the First Amendment,
"intersection between employee organizational rights and employer speech rights,"
thus the NLRB was left to reconcile these interests. Brown, 128 S. Ct. at 2413.
Initially, the NLRB took the strong position that section 8 requires total employer
neutrality during organizational campaigns. Id. Under this approach, any partisan
employer speech would interfere with the workers' rights to organize, bargain
collectively, and engage in concerted activity for their own protection under section
7 of the NLRA. Id. The Supreme Court's holding in Virginia Electric limited the
NLRB's aggressive interpretation by holding that "nothing in the NLRA prohibits
an employer 'from expressing its view on labor policies or problems' unless the
employer's speech 'in connection with other circumstances [amounts] to coercion
within the meaning of the Act."' Id. (quoting Va. Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. at
477). In response to the continuing restrictive regulation on employer speech,
Congress passed the LMRA to amend sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA to protect
speech by both unions and employers from regulation by the NLRB. Brown, 128
S. Ct. at 2413. Section 8(c) both implements the First Amendment by responding
to particular constitutional rulings of the NLRB and shows a congressional intent to
encourage free debate in this area. Id.
84. Id. at 2414. The area of noncoercive speech is both implicitly and
explicitly protected under the NLRA. Id. The majority notes that "[s]ections 8(a)
and 8(b) demonstrate that when Congress has sought to put limits on advocacy for
or against union organization, it has expressly set forth the mechanisms for doing
so." Id. Additionally, section 7 gives employees the right to refuse to join a union,
which implies the right to receive information that opposes union organization. Id.
Finally, section 8(c) "expressly precludes regulation of speech about unionization"
as long as the communication is noncoercive. Id. The majority concludes that the
mere fact that Congress took the effort to amend the NLRA, rather than continue to
leave it to the courts and the NLRB to determine it on a case-by-case basis, shows
intent to favor wide-open debate and leave noncoercive employer speech
unregulated. Id.
85. Id.
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but whether it 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives' of the NLRA. '86
Under the NLRA, California cannot regulate noncoercive employer
speech about unionization either directly through an express
prohibition 87 or indirectly through the imposition of spending
restrictions.88 By imposing spending restrictions on state funds for
activities promoting or deterring union organization and directly
restricting employer speech about unionization, AB 1889 became an
86. Id. at 2417 (quoting Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 120 (1994)). The
en banc majority discussed the argument that AB 1889 violates the First
Amendment because "[a] statutory blanket prohibition on employers advocating for
or against unions would blatantly violate the First Amendment as the state has no
legitimate interest in prohibiting employers from speaking on union issues."
Lockyer IV, 463 F.3d at 1099. Once the state has chosen to award the contract,
their interest in the funds used as payment for the contracted goods and services is
gone. Id. The majority opinion here does not delve further into this analysis
because it finds that the issue presented is whether the California statute stands in
the way of the implementation of the NLRA's goals. Brown, 128 S. Ct. at 2417.
87. Id. at 2415. The Supreme Court has held that when a State is acting as a
market participant, as opposed to a regulator, the regulations will not be preempted
by the NLRA. Id.; see Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. at 218. In Boston Harbor, the
NLRA did not preempt a state agency requiring contractors on a construction
project to follow a labor agreement because the action was aimed at a specific
contract in order to ensure the project would be completed at the lowest cost.
Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. at 232. The majority, in concordance with prior opinions
in the litigation, stated that California enacted AB 1889 in its regulatory capacity
and did not act as a market participant. Brown, 128 S. Ct. at 2415. The state's
purpose was to further a labor policy and "impose[] a targeted negative restriction
on employer speech about unionization." Id.
88. Id. at 2415. In Gould, the Supreme Court held that Wisconsin's policy that
the state would not purchase goods and services from three-time NLRA violators
was preempted under the Garmon doctrine because it imposed a conflicting
sanction that disrupted the NLRA's regulation scheme. Id. (citing Gould, 475 U.S.
at 288-89 (1986)). Wisconsin argued that the statute intended to be an exercise of
spending power rather than regulatory power, but the court held that these were
essentially one and the same. Brown, 128 S. Ct. at 2415 (citing Gould, 475 U.S. at
287). "Wisconsin's choice to 'use its spending power rather than its police power
d[id] not significantly lessen the inherent potential for conflict' between the state
and federal schemes[, so] the statute was pre-empted." Brown, 128 S. Ct. at 2415
(quoting Gould, 475 U.S. at 289). Under this ruling, the majority held that
imposing a "use" restriction as opposed to a "receipt" restriction is "no more
consequential than Wisconsin's reliance on its spending power rather than its
police power in Gould." Brown, 128 S. Ct. at 2416.
obstruction to the execution of employer free speech under the
NLRA.
Coupling the restrictions on the use of state funds with
compliance costs and litigation risks, AB 1889 reached beyond
California's sovereign interest in the use of state funds.89 Significant
enforcement mechanisms put pressure on the employer to forgo its
right to free speech or refuse the receipt of necessary state funds,
which the majority found to silence one side of the intended debate
under the NLRA.9 ° A state is able to fund a program dedicated to
advance permissible goals, but the state cannot "use its spending
power to advance an interest that ...frustrates the comprehensive
federal scheme established by the Act."9 1
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals previously held that the
Machinist doctrine was inapplicable to this statute because employer
speech in regard to union organization is not a zone that Congress left
free from all regulation. 92 The NLRB has policed a narrow zone of
89. Id. AB 1889 required recipients of state funds to keep records showing
that no state funds were used for prohibited activities or expenditures. Id.
Additionally, the statute "presume[d] that any expenditure to assist, promote, or
deter union organizing made from 'commingled' funds constitute[d] a violation of
the statute." Id. (citing CAL. Gov'T CODE §16646(b) (2009)). The majority
explained that this requirement is extremely difficult because a prohibited
expenditure includes not only isolated expenses, such as legal fees, but also
allocation of overhead for "time and resources spent on union-related advocacy."
Brown, 128 S. Ct. at 2416 (citing CAL. GOV'T CODE §16646(a)). The statute also
did not provide a safe harbor, unless the expense is incurred with activities favoring
unions or required by law. Brown, 128 S. Ct. at 2416 (citing CAL. Gov'T CODE
§ 16647). AB 1889 authorized both the Attorney General and a private taxpayer,
which would include a union, to bring a civil action against violating employers for
"injunctive relief, damages, civil penalties, and other appropriate equitable relief."
Brown, 128 S. Ct. at 2416 (quoting CAL. Gov'T CODE § 16645.8(a)). This means
that essentially a somewhat trivial violation of the statute, perhaps commingling of
state and private funds, may give rise to substantial liability. Brown, 128 S. Ct. at
2416. These enforcement mechanisms put pressure on the employer to forgo its
speech rights or refuse state funds. Id.
90. Id. AB 1889 "chills one side of 'the robust debate which has been
protected under the NLRA."' Id. at 2417 (quoting Letter Carriers, 418 U.S. at
275).
91. Brown, 128 S. Ct. at 2417.
92. Lockyer IV, 463 F.3d at 1089. The Court of Appeals en banc panel held
that the NLRB's regulation of organizing activities shows that employer speech
was not intended to be an area left free of regulation. Id. See, e.g., Peoria Plastic
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speech under section 9 of the NLRA to protect and ensure free and
fair elections. 93  In contrast to the Ninth Circuit en banc panel's
opinion, the majority held that regardless of the NLRB's regulatory
authority over elections, Congress did not grant it the "authority to
regulate the broader category of noncoercive speech encompassed by
AB 1889." 94  Furthermore, because Congress did not grant this
regulatory authority to the NLRB, California also does not have the
authority because "[s]tates have no more authority than the [NLRB]
to upset the balance that Congress has struck between labor and
management." 95
The en banc panel had also argued that Congress did not intend to
preempt AB 1889 because Congress itself has passed similar
restrictions and provisions forbidding the use of grant and program
funds to "assist, promote, or deter union organizing."96 However, the
majority was "not persuaded that these few isolated restrictions ...
intended to alter . . . federal labor policy." 97  Unlike the states,
Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 545, 547-48 (1957) (NLRB barred interviews with employees
immediately prior to an election); Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427, 429
(1953) (NLRB prevented employers and unions from making election speeches
within 24 hours of an election). See also NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324,
330 (1946) ("Congress has entrusted the Board with a wide degree of discretion in
establishing the procedure and safeguards necessary to insure the fair and free
choice of bargaining representatives by employees.").
93. Brown, 128 S. Ct. at 2417. Section 9 of the NLRA grants the NLRB power
to regulate employer and union conduct that is prejudicial to a fair election,
including employer speech. 29 U.S.C. § 159. The Supreme Court held that the
NLRB can set aside an election for a misrepresentation of a material fact within a
campaign if it had an effect on the free choice of employees. See Linn v. United
Plant Guard Workers of Am., Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 60 (1966).
94. Brown, 128 S. Ct. at 2417.
95. Id. (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 751
(1985)).
96. Brown, 128 S. Ct. at 2418; see Lockyer IV. 463 F.3d at 1090-91. The
Ninth Circuit panel points to three main statutes. First, the Workforce Investment
Act provides assurances that funds received under this Act will not be used to
assist, promote, or deter union organizing. 29 U.S.C. § 293 1(b)(7) (2009). Second,
the Head Start Programs Act does not allow appropriated funds to be used for the
promotion or deterrence of union organization. 42 U.S.C. § 9839(e). Third, the
National Community Service Act does not allow the assistance provided under the
act to be used by participants for these purposes either. 42 U.S.C. § 12634(b)(1).
97. Brown, 128 S. Ct. at 2418 (quoting Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 753) (internal
citation omitted).
Congress has the ability to "create tailored exceptions to otherwise
applicable federal policies" because any adaptation to the statute
applies nationwide, preserving uniformity." Therefore, "the mere
fact that Congress [enacted] federal restrictions on union-related
advocacy in certain limited contexts does not invite the States to
override federal labor policy in other settings." 99
B. Justice Breyer's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, disagreed with the
majority's decision that AB 1889 is preempted under the Machinists
doctrine because he did not feel that the spending limitations
amounted to regulation that would be preempted by the NLRA. '00
First, the dissent argued that AB 1889 does not try to compel or
forbid labor related activity because employers are still able to
engage in the assisting, promoting, or deterring of union
organization, they are just prohibited from doing so with state
funds. 10' Refusing to pay for a certain activity is not the same as
compelling others to engage in the activity; therefore, AB 1889
neither compels labor related activity nor forbids it.' 0 2  Second,
98. Brown, 128 S. Ct. at 2418.
99. Id. The majority also noted that if Congress had enacted a federal
regulation that was exactly the same as AB 1889 in regard to spending restrictions
on all federal grants or funds, then the preemption argument would be closer. Id.
However, none of the statutes cited by the Ninth Circuit were nationwide,
contained comparable provisions, or contained pro-union exemptions. Id.
100. Id. at 2419 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer found that the relevant
statute in Gould was radically different from AB 1889 because the Wisconsin
statute "prohibited the State from doing business with firms that repeatedly violated
the NLRA." Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court held that the
Wisconsin statute's main purpose was to enforce the NLRA's requirements, which
is a function reserved for the NLRB, thus explicitly conflicting with the goals and
intent of Congress.
101. Id. at 2420 (Breyer J., dissenting). Employers receiving state funds were
able to "assist, promote, or deter union organizing," just not on the state's dime. Id.
(Breyer, J., dissenting). Therefore, because employers still had the ability to
engage in this activity, California's "refusal to pay for labor-related speech does
not impermissibly discourage that activity." Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis
omitted).
102. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer pointed out that just because
the state of California has chosen to prohibit employers from using state funds for
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federal statutes imposing restrictions on the use of federal funds
demonstrate Congress' intent to permit the state to ratify similar
legislature. 103 Rather than believing the idea that Congress intended
the NLRA to prevent states from enacting similar legislation, Justice
Breyer considers that Congress believed directing funds away from
labor related activity was consistent with the intended policy of
encouraging free debate. 10 4 Finally, state legislatures are generally
given broad authority in determining how to spend state funds, and a
state can allocate funds without participating or regulating the labor
market.'0 5 The mere fact that California is not acting as a market
participant does not necessarily mean that they are acting as an
impermissible regulator which would subject the statute to
preemption under the Machinists doctrine, as the majority opinion
held. 106
labor-related speech, employers are not strictly prohibited from engaging in the
activity. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Failure to pay for an activity does not result in
compelling the activity. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
103. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer referred to the three statutes
noted in the Ninth Circuit's panel opinion. See supra note 96. The Workforce
Investment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2931(b)(7) (1998); The Head Start Programs Act, 42
U.S.C. § 9839(e) (2007), and The National Community Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §
12634(b)(1) (2000). Brown, 128 S. Ct. at 2420 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
104. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). The dissent concluded that because Congress
enacted three statutes using identical language to that of AB 1889, California's
statute does not weaken congressional policy. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 2420-21 (Breyer J., dissenting). The Supreme Court has ruled that
the legislature has the right to choose not to fund activities even though those
activities may be otherwise protected. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation
of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983) (holding that a "legislature's decision not to
subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right.").
106. Id. at 2421 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed out that the
converse of "market participant" is not necessarily "regulator." Id. at 2421
(Breyer, J., dissenting). A state can freely allocate funds without participating or
regulating the labor market, and the NLRA will only preempt a state's actions
when they amount to impermissible regulation. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice
Breyer also did not find the fact that the statute imposes a restriction only
applicable to labor to be a "fatal objection" because if a state can prohibit
employers from using state funds for broad categories of expenses, like overhead,
then it should be able to regulate the use of funds for smaller categories, like
overhead expenses related to management's role in labor organization. Id. (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
Additionally, the dissent notes that the majority appears to find
the compliance provisions of AB 1889 too strict, and through neutral
enforcement, they discourage the use of non-state funds to engage in
free debate on labor issues.10 7 However, Justice Breyer is not clear
as to which provisions will actually deter a state fund recipient from
using non-state funds to engage in unionization matters.108
Therefore, the dissent concludes that the issue should be remanded to
the District Court for more clarification and findings on the question
of whether the specific compliance provisions of AB 1889
"constitute sufficient grounds for finding the statute pre-empted."10 9
V. EFFECT OF THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
A. Legal Impact of Decision on Efforts to Limit Noncoercive
Employer Speech
Section 8(c) of the NLRA protects free debate on unionization by
maintaining the free exchange of ideas from both unions and
employers. Limiting or strictly regulating noncoercive speech
inhibits an employer's ability to inform employees of information
regarding the consequences of unionization, thus suppressing one
side of the debate. Originally, the NLRA was focused on
encouraging union organization, but the LMRA amendments shifted
the emphasis to a "more balanced statutory scheme [protecting]
rights of workers to join or not join a union, [adding] restrictions on
unions, [and] guaranteeing certain freedom of speech and conduct to
employers and individual employees."" 0  By adding section 8(c) to
107. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). While Justice Breyer agreed with the majority
in that if the compliance provisions discourage the spending of non-state funds then
AB 1889 should be preempted by the NLRA, he was not convinced that the statute
would have that effect, based on the record before the Court. Id. (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). The dissent found the language and requirements of the statute very
clear, but was not sure whether these provisions would actually deter a recipient of
state funds from spending personal money to engage in unionization matters. Id. at
2421-22 (Breyer J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 2422 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
109. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
110. William J. Kilberg & Jennifer J. Schulp, Chamber of Commerce v.
Brown: Protecting Free Debate on Unionization, 2008 Sup. CT. REv. 189, 203
(2008).
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the Act, the NLRA now guaranteed employers the right of free
speech and finally designated the same freedom of expression rights
enjoyed by unions to employers." '
In response to an employer-friendly federal labor regulation
scheme, union supporters have increasingly enlisted state and local
governments to launch efforts to curtail employer speech in
opposition to unionization. The Supreme Court's recent decision in
Chamber of Commerce v. Brown found that state regulation
interfering with the employee's choice regarding unionization is
within a zone reserved for market freedom, and is preempted by the
NLRA under the Machinists doctrine.12 As a result, recently
popular state and local efforts to issue legislation curtailing employer
noncoercive speech about unionization will be preempted by federal
law.
1. State and Local Initiatives to Limit Employer Speech
The Supreme Court's holding in Chamber of Commerce v. Brown
bars the ability of state and local legislatures to regulate employer
speech indirectly by imposing spending restrictions on government
funds. " 3 Thus, state and local laws similar to AB 1889 will clearly
be preempted under the Machinists doctrine and the Supreme Court's
ruling. However, what will the effect of the Supreme Court's
decision be on neutrality agreements constructed differently from AB
1889, but still limiting employer speech?
Due to a lack of enforcement by the NLRB and seemingly
ineffective ability of the NLRA to protect basic rights of workers,
many states and local governments have enacted legislation to
supplement regulation where federal law is silent or absent. 114
111. H.R. REP. No. 80-5 10, at 45 (1947) (Conf. Rep.). The amendments were
enacted to "protect the right of free speech when what the employer says or writes
is not of a threatening nature or does not promise a prohibited favorable
discrimination." Id.
112. Brown, 128 S. Ct. at 2414.
113. Id. at 2415-16.
114. Paul M. Secunda, The Ironic Necessity for State Protection of Workers,
157 U. PA. L. REV. 29, 29 (2008). Professor Paul Secunda of Marquette University
Law School makes the argument that states are best equipped to protect worker's
rights under the law. Id. NLRA proponents originally "saw its enactment as a way
to overcome [the] anti-union state influences and to foster at the federal level the
Legislation similar to AB 1889 has been gaining popularity at the
state and local level to increase union organization and curtail
employer speech in opposition to organizational efforts. States have
imposed neutrality agreements and legislation limiting the use of
state funds that either (1) define the prohibited uses more specifically
than AB 1889 or (2) target specific industries and employers. 115
Local governments have also enacted labor peace legislation
requiring employers to enter into agreements with unions as a
condition for receiving state funds.
a) More Specific State Neutrality Laws
One alternative to the broad statutory language of AB 1889 is
more specific legislation defining for what purposes the employer
can and cannot use state funds. In New York, the State Assembly
passed a bill prohibiting employers from using state money to:
(a) train managers, supervisors, and other
administrative personnel on methods to encourage or
discourage union organization, . .. (b) hire or pay
attorneys, consultants or other contractors to
encourage or discourage union organization,... or (c)
hire employees or pay the salary and other
compensation of employees whose principal job duties
are to encourage or discourage union organization. 116
use of collective bargaining to promote the workplace rights of employees." Id.
Over time, however, the federal government "has proven unwilling and unable to
protect the basic rights of workers" through the NLRA and other federal acts
governing labor law, such as the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) and the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA). Id. Professor
Secunda argues that state laws should be encouraged in order to protect worker's
rights because historically "[c]ourts, agencies, and employers have routinely
operated together in order to stifle employee's rights to organize." Id. at 30.
115 See Logan, supra note 36, at 158. Several states have enacted legislation,
or neutrality agreement laws, that "prohibit employers [receiving] state funds from
using that money to promote or deter unionization." Id. AB 1889 was based upon
more specific neutrality regulations and was expected to benefit unions while
keeping the state neutral during union organization campaigns. Id.
116 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 211-a (McKinney 2009).
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This New York bill allows employers to use state funds to
finance "other nonspecified anti-union activities, such as captive-
audience meetings, provid[ed] they are not conducted by someone
whose principal job is to discourage unionization."'1 17  In contrast
with AB 1889, the New York bill did not include effective
enforcement provisions or civil penalties for violations of the
regulation." 8 These types of statutes encourage employer neutrality
in the area of union representation for employers receiving a
significant portion of their income from the state, while limiting
employer noncoercive speech protected under section 8(c) of the
NLRA. 119
While provisions with specific limitations on how an employer
can use state funds, like the New York bill, are unlike California's
blanket prohibition on the use of public money to deter unionization
efforts, they still place limitations on an employer's protected
exercise of free speech. In most instances, these statutes will be
preempted, similarly to AB 1889, because "once a given employer is
subject to such laws by virtue of the receipt of a certain amount of
public funds for any of its operations, all of its operations are subject
to their prohibitions, not just those operating by virtue of the grant..
. ."120 The majority opinion in Brown concludes that a state cannot
"use its spending power to advance an interest that ... frustrates the
comprehensive federal scheme established by [the NLRA]."'' 1 The
opinion, however, did not find specific types of prohibited activities
117 Logan, supra note 36, at 181.
118 See id. AB 1889 included compliance costs and litigation risks and the
Supreme Court found it preempted because the enforcement mechanisms put
pressure on the employer to either stay quiet and receive state funds or refuse the
state funding and speak freely. Brown, 128 S. Ct. at 2416; see also supra note 89.
119. Benjamin I. Sachs, Labor Law Renewal, 1 HARV. L. & POL'Y REv. 375,
388 (2007). This New York statute has been found by a district court to be
preempted under the Machinists doctrine, but the decision was reversed by the
Second Circuit and remanded to the district court for further findings regarding the
effect of the regulation but did not preclude the district court's finding of
Machinists or Garmon preemption. See Healthcare Ass'n of New York State, Inc.
v. Pataki, 388 F. Supp. 2d 6 (N.D.N.Y. 2005), rev'd, 471 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2006).
120. See Brian R. Garrison & Joseph C. Pettygrove, "Yes, No, and Maybe":
The Implications of a Federal Circuit Court Split over Union-Friendly State and
Local "Neutrality" Laws, 23 LAB. LAW. 121, 148 (2007).
121. Brown, 128 S. Ct. at 2417.
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that have the effect of limiting employer speech to be a relevant
factor in the preemption analysis. Rather, the Court focused on
whether the free debate intended by Congress was hindered through
limitations on employer's speech, not the specific means by which
that speech was limited. As a result, it appears that in light of the
Supreme Court's decision, even though these types of statutes
specifically define actions regarding the use of state funds, they will
be preempted by the NLRA provided the provisions continue to limit
employer speech.
b) Legislation Targeting Specific Industries or Employers
Prior to the Supreme Court's holding in Brown, circuit courts
have upheld state legislation placing restrictions on state funds that
are targeted at specific industries or types of employers. In 2002,
Florida passed limited neutrality legislation "restrict[ing] the use of
state funds to promote or deter unionization only in nursing
homes."'1 22 This bill was part of the Service Employees International
Union's effort to pass "Healthcare Funds for Healthcare Only" bills
in several states "to prevent the misappropriation of health care funds
[and] to limit employer conduct." 123  Under the Florida statute,
managers are prohibited from performing anti-union activities in the
midst of employees caring for Medicare beneficiaries. 124 Rhode
Island passed similar legislation preventing employers from using
Medicaid reimbursement funds to influence an employee's decision
of whether or not to join a union. 125
The Seventh Circuit upheld an Illinois statute in 2005 requiring
entities receiving subsidies for construction of renewable fuel plans
to enter into a labor agreement "establish[ing] wages and benefits and
* . .includ[ing] a no-strike clause."' 126 The court found that Illinois
was not acting in a proprietary capacity, but was still protected under
the market participant exception because it did act as a regulator
seeking to affect labor relations generally through a targeted
122. Logan, supra note 36, at 183.
123. See id.
124. FLA. STAT. § 400.334 (2009).
125. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-8.2-23 (2009).
126. N. Ill. Chapter of Assoc. Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Lavin, 431 F.3d
1004, 1005 (7th Cir. 2005).
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statute.'27  The court held that Illinois limited the conditions on
spending to a specific project and did not engage in regulation
resulting in preemption by federal law.' 
28
For several reasons, targeted statutes will be found preempted by
the NLRA as a result of the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Brown. First, the Illinois statute was exceptionally narrow and
applied only to a specific project and a narrow group of contracting
parties; however, the Florida and Rhode Island statutes do not affect
such a narrow group because of the numerous contracting parties in
the health care industry. Second, the Supreme Court explains that
targeted statutes may fall within the right of Congress, which has the
"authority to create tailored exceptions to otherwise applicable
federal policies ...in a manner that preserves national uniformity
without opening the door to a 50-state patchwork of inconsistent
labor policies."' 29  This statement seems to eliminate the state's
ability to "implement restrictions on employer speech targeted to
affect only certain groups of employers."' 3 °  Therefore, targeted
restrictions will only survive preemption if they can be drafted to fall
within the market participant exception to preemption. 31 By
definition, legislation under the market participant exception cannot
have the effect of broadly regulating labor relations, so while targeted
restrictions may survive preemption through acting as a market
127 Id. at 1006. Unlike Boston Harbor, where Boston hired the general
contractors for the project, Illinois did not hire contractors, invest in the project
through bonds, or have a proprietary interest in the project. Id.; see Boston Harbor,
507 U.S. at 227. Furthermore, Illinois does not seek to affect labor relations
generally and "[b]oth labor and management are free to make independent
decisions with respect to all activities other than those for which the state pays."
Lavin, 431 F.3d at 1006. Conditions on spending are not considered "regulation"
unless they "affect conduct other than the financed project." Id. (citing Wisconsin
Dep't of Indus. v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282 (1986)). Therefore, because Illinois
"limited its condition to the project financed by the subsidy, it has not engaged in
'regulation' . . and its conditions are not preempted by federal law." Lavin, 431
F.3d at 1007.
128. Id.
129. Brown, 128 S. Ct. at 2418.
130. Kilberg & Schulp, supra note 110, at 209.
131. Id. Governments attempting to meet the market participant exception test
encounter difficulties in areas outside of construction because it is often difficult to
allocate money on a "per-project" basis. Garrison & Pettygrove, supra note 120, at
150.
participant, they will not achieve the broad regulatory effect intended
by union supporters.
c) Labor Peace Agreements
Labor peace agreements have become popular at the city and
county levels of government. Under these agreements, the
governmental entity requires employers to sign an agreement with
unions in return for government financial assistance. 132  The
agreements generally require employers to provide "employee
information .. .early in the organizing campaign, and refrain from
making disparaging statements about the union," and the union must
agree to "forego strikes, boycotts, or other disruptive organizing
tactics" and consent to arbitrate future disputes.'33 The agreement
does not require employer neutrality, but it does prohibit the
employer from "expressing false or misleading information relevant
to the question of unionization and ...compelling employees to
attend meetings on the question of unionization." 134
The Third Circuit upheld a labor peace ordinance against a
preemption challenge where the City of Pittsburgh conditioned grants
of tax increment financing upon the recipient's acceptance of a labor
neutrality agreement under local legislation. 35 The court held that
by enacting an ordinance "specifically tailored to protect its
proprietary interest in the value of the tax-revenue-generating
property," the City of Pittsburgh was acting as a market participant
and "reasonable investor in applying conditions to its multimillion
132. Logan, supra note 36, at 184.
133. Id.
134. Sachs, supra note 119, at 388-89. In these situations, unlike AB 1889, the
city or county does not have an opportunity to be "neutral," but rather is required to
enter a labor-management agreement prohibiting employers from stating false or
misleading information or compelling employees to attend meetings regarding
unionization. Id. This essentially may be seen as restricting employer speech, and
since the Supreme Court's ruling in Brown, may be deemed preempted under the
NLRA.
135. Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Union, Local 57 v. Sage Hospitality
Res., 390 F.3d 206, 208 (3d Cir. 2004). The agreement was to include a no
picketing promise, a provision that union representation be determined by the card
check process, and that all disputes under the agreement be settled through
arbitration. Id. at 208-09.
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dollar investment," an exception to preemption by the NLRA. 136 In
contrast, the Seventh Circuit invalidated a labor peace agreement
holding that it was preempted by the NLRA.1 37  Under the
Milwaukee County ordinance, firms with "contracts with the County
for the provision of transportation and other services for elderly and
disabled County residents" must negotiate "labor peace agreements"
with unions;1 38 however, the court found that these agreements
136. Id. at 217. In Boston Harbor, the Massachusetts Water Resources
Authority implemented a requirement that all contractors working on the harbor
cleanup project must sign a collective bargaining agreement recognizing a specific
union. Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. at 218. The Supreme Court held that this
regulation was not preempted by the NLRA because Massachusetts Water
Resources Authority was acting as a "market participant" with the purpose of
ensuring that the project would be completed quickly and efficiently at a low cost,
as opposed to an effort to regulate the conduct of others outside of the harbor
cleanup project. Id. at 232. In contrast, the court in Gould held that a provision
broadly disqualifying firms with multiple past labor law violations from doing
business with the state was preempted because the statute was not related to a
proprietary interest in ongoing projects, but more broad and regulatory in nature.
Gould, 475 U.S. at 288. The Third Circuit held that the City of Pittsburgh enacted
the ordinance requiring contractors to enter into a labor neutrality agreement as a
market participant because the city "is a partner in the proprietary interests of the
URA itself [and] the URA as issuer of the [tax increment financing] bonds has a
proprietary financial interest in the.., development project that is the same as that
of any (nonprofit) private entity that finances a development by issuing bonds."
Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Union, Local 57, 390 F.3d at 216-17.
Therefore, the agreement is "specifically tailored to protect its proprietary interest
in the value of the tax-revenue-generating property," and the "[c]ity has an interest
in ensuring that labor strife does not damage the development," which is similar to
the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority's position in Boston Harbor. Id. at
217; See Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. at 221.
137. Metro. Milwaukee Ass'n of Commerce v. Milwaukee County, 431 F.3d
277 (7th Cir. 2005).
138. Id. at 277-78. Milwaukee's ordinance requires the labor peace agreement
to (1) prohibit employers from engaging in coercive speech regarding selection of a
bargaining representative, (2) require employers to furnish contact information of
employees providing services to the County, and (3) forbid unions from engaging
in economic action against the employer. Id. at 278. This ordinance is tilted in
favor of unions primarily because there is no sanction for a union violating the
ordinance, other than "excus[ing] the employer from further compliance with [the
ordinance] in regard to that union." Id. The court notes that had the city been
intervening in its labor relations with firms from which it buys services in order to
reduce the cost or increase the quality of services, then the ordinance would escape
would further affect the contractors' labor relations with private
hospitals and nursing homes. '39 The provision excluding employees
under a County contract from required attendance at a meeting to
influence the selection of union representation would not just apply
to employees spending all their time on a County contract, but all
employees of the party contracting with the County, even those who
do not work on County contracts. 140 Thus, the court held that the
"County [was] trying to substitute its own labor-management
philosophy for that of the [NLRA]" by prohibiting all employees and
employers contracting with the County from expressing any
opposition to unionization. 141
These two contrasting circuit decisions indicate ambiguity as to
whether the NLRA preempts labor peace legislation that limits
employer speech by requiring the employer to enter into neutrality
agreements with unions. However, both the Third and Seventh
Circuit holdings appear to align with the Supreme Court's recent
decision. The court in Brown held that "[a]lthough a State may
choose to fund a program dedicated to advance certain permissible
goals, it is not permissible for a State to use its spending power to
advance an interest that . .. frustrates the comprehensive federal
scheme established by that Act."' 142  This statement indicates that
labor peace legislation placing conditions limiting employer
noncoercive speech on the receipt of state funds would interfere with
an area left open to free debate, an interest frustrating Congress'
intended purpose. Requiring a company to choose between allowing
their employers to exercise their right to free speech and forego state
funding versus accepting state funds and agreeing to limit their
speech in opposition to unionization suppresses one side of the free
preemption under the market participant exception. See Boston Harbor, 507 U.S.
at 232.
139. Milwaukee, 431 F.3d at 279. The obligation to negotiate a labor peace
agreement would be triggered when a union sought to represent employees
working on the employer's contracts with the County, but most of the agreement
would also apply to the employer's other employees, who many never work on a
County contract, but will still be subjected to the employer speech limitations. Id.
140. Id. at 278-79.
141. Id.
142. Brown, 128 S. Ct. at 2417 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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debate. 143 Furthermore, labor peace legislation will face the same
dilemma as targeted legislation falling into the market participant
exception of preemption. While legislation may escape preemption if
the provisions are negotiated for a specific project and the city or
county plays the role of a market participant, by definition, it will be
a valid regulation, but cannot have the broad impact on labor
relations that was the driving force behind the legislation in the first
place. 144
2. Federal Legislation Enacted to Limit Employer Speech
The statutory language of the NLRA and the labor-management
relationship has remained unchanged for several decades. Since the
LMRA amendments were passed in 1947, very little has been done in
response to unions and employers taking advantage of the current law
to influence labor relations. 145 Politics are partly to blame because
for many decades both employers and organized labor have had
enough support to block any significant legislation they oppose. 146
143. Id. The Supreme Court held that AB 1889 "chills one side of the robust
debate which has been protected under the NLRA." Id. (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
144. See supra note 44.
145. Senator Arlen Specter & Eric S. Nguyen, Representation Without
Intimidation: Securing Workers' Right to Choose Under the National Labor
Relations Act, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 311, 314-15 (2008). Congress enacted the
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, or Landrum-Griffin
Act, which gave union officials "fiduciary responsibility over members' funds,
increased financial transparency, and required honest internal union elections." Id.
Since the Landrum-Griffin Act, Congress has also passed important legislation
affecting (1) pensions and employee benefits, Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, and (2) worker safety, Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970, but nothing in regard to union and employer actions during selection of
representation. Id.
146. Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1540 (2002). Neither side has had a majority, but each
minority is well-organized and "committed enough to tie up a bill through the
arcane supermajority requirements of the Senate . through filibuster . ." Id.
For example, President Carter's Labor Law Reform Act of 1977, which was
introduced to curtail an employer's overwhelming advantage during union
campaigns and the NLRA's inadequate deterrence of employer misconduct, died
after a five-week filibuster and six unsuccessful attempts to end the debate in the
Union supporters, however, continue to argue that the federal
government's employer-friendly legislation comes at the expense of
declining unionization. 147  Frustration over declining union
membership rates and inevitable federal preemption of state and local
initiatives to curb employer speech under the Supreme Court's
decision in Brown may lead organized labor to seek enactment of
federal legislation restricting funds to limit employer speech on
unionization or amendments to the NLRA and NLRB.
a) Federal Legislation Restricting Funds to Limit Employer
Speech
The en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit argued that Congress
could not have intended to preempt statutes similar to AB 1889
because it had already passed similar restrictions on the use of state
funds to "assist, promote, or deter union organizing." 148 The
Supreme Court discussed this issue by clarifying that the statutes
relied upon by the Ninth Circuit en banc panel "neither conflict with
the NLRA nor otherwise establish that Congress 'decided to tolerate
a substantial measure of diversity' in the regulation of employer
speech."149 Nothing in the majority opinion conclusively said that the
federal statutes with funding restrictions are prohibited, and Congress
has the "authority to create tailored exceptions to otherwise
applicable federal policies ...in a manner that preserves national
uniformity."' 150
In order to limit employer speech, unions may fight for the
enactment of funding restrictions on targeted federal legislation.
Placing restrictions on the recipient's use of certain federal funds
Senate. Id. This was the last time in decades the Congress has considered or
debated reforming the NLRA. See Specter & Nguyen, supra note 145, at 315.
147. Specter & Nguyen, supra note 145, at 311. Scholars argue that union
membership has decreased as a result of employer suppression and lack of
remedies under the NLRB for employer hostilities. Id.
148. Lockyer IV, 463 F.3d at 1090-91. The Ninth Circuit panel points to three
main statutes: (1) The Workforce Investment, 29 U.S.C. § 2931(b)(7), (2) The
Head Start Programs Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9839(e), and (3) The National Community
Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12634(b)(1).
149. Brown, 128 S. Ct. at 2418 (quoting N.Y. Tel. Co. v. N.Y. State Dep't. of
Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 546 (1979)).
150. Id.
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would have a substantial impact on the industry as a whole. A
subsequent response to increased targeted restrictions on federal
funding might be a weakened NLRA preemptive effect.151 The
Supreme Court acknowledged that a federal statute narrows the scope
of NLRA preemption if it establishes tolerance of a "substantial
measure of diversity." 152 If numerous federal states contain targeted
funding restrictions, then "the effect over time may be exactly the
tolerance of such diversity," and the scope and effect of NLRA
preemption would be extensive and weakened. 153
b) Increased Effectiveness of the NLRB's Enforcement
In order for both unions and employers to effectively promote, or
deter union organization, there must be a functioning system of labor
relations providing an "effective enforcement of remedies." 154
Because of the NLRB's inability to effectively enforce the provisions
of the NLRA in regard to union election campaigns, both employers
and organized labor regularly engage in coercive tactics to exert
pressure on employees. 155  The NLRB experiences considerable
delays in case processing, which results in a lack of enforcement of
the agency's ruling in federal court. 156  Furthermore, standard
151. Kilberg & Schulp, supra note 110, at 212.
152. Brown, 128 S. Ct. at 2418 (quoting N.Y Tel. Co., 440 U.S. at 546).
153. Kilberg & Schulp, supra note 110, at 212.
154. Specter & Nguyen, supra note 145, at 322.
155. Id. at 320. Neither side is more innocent in regard to abusing the current
system. Unions regularly mislead employees into signing authorization cards,
threaten workers to sign the cards, visit homes of employees who choose not to
support the unions, and unlawfully promising advantages and benefits to members
if the union was certified by secret ballot vote. Id. at 320-21. On the other side,
employers have been found to unlawfully threaten employees, restrict their ability
to solicit union support, and provide union organizers with incorrect contact
information. Id. at 321.
156. Id. at 322-23. In some cases, the delay between filing a complaint with
the NLRB and their decision can be more than a couple years long. Id. The Eighth
Circuit reprimanded the NLRB for "inexcusable and unfortunate" delays. See
NLRB v. Mountain Country Food Stores, Inc., 931 F.2d 21, 23 (8th Cir. 1991).
This delay generally "render[s] a bargaining order unenforceable and a new
election . grossly ineffectual." Specter & Nguyen, supra note 145, at 323.
Furthermore, it is detrimental to employers because the costs of extensive litigation
and potential back add up over time. Id. at 324.
remedies implemented by the Board "include reinstating unlawfully
discharged workers and requiring employers to compensate those
employees with back pay less income earned between the firing and
the decision;" however, these remedies do nothing to deter violations
or ensure that the employee has the right to choose.157
Republican Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania illustrated two
ways Congress can focus on increasing the effectiveness of the
NLRB to ensure the employee's freedom of choice: (1) reduce the
window of time during which both sides could cheat and increasing
the remedies when deceit occurs, and (2) pass legislation focusing on
securing employee freedom of choice.' 58 Changing the law will not
eliminate either employers' or organized labor's motives to pressure
employees to vote one way or the other in a union representative
election; however, creating a new system of enforcement that deters
unfair labor practices and limits the employer's opportunity to
engage in similarly bad conduct would correct some of these
problems.
c) Enact Amendments to the NLRA
The text of the NLRA has remained virtually untouched for
several decades; however, the labor force has changed dramatically
during this time.' 59  Remaining employer-friendly, the NLRA
protects the employer's right to express opposition to unionization
and recognizes their right to compel employees to listen to "captive
audience" meetings and exclude union representatives from the
workplace all together. 160  In opposition, unions might seek to
157. Id. at 325. Unfortunately, the remedies awarded by the NLRB are so
weak and the incentives for employers or unions to cross the line are too great that
the traditional remedies are not effective deterrents. Id.
158. Id. at 319.
159. See Estlund, supra note 146, at 1535-36. Since 1959, women have
entered the workforce in great numbers, racial and ethnic diversity has flourished,
mass production and stable workplace hierarchies have changed to more customer
centered production methods and team-based organizations, and laws regarding
employment and granting individual employee rights increased. Id. at 1536.
However, in light of all these transformations, the NLRA has remained the same,
leaving the states to regulate what they can and creating a complicated system of
labor law for employers and unions to follow.
160. Id. at 1536-37.
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"directly undermine the protections of free debate provided by
section 8(c)[, which] the court recognized as preempting AB
1889." '161 Restricting employer speech, however, will raise First
Amendment concerns because the Supreme Court has acknowledged
employers' First Amendment right to engage in noncoercive speech
about unionization.162 The scope of this right to free speech has not
been fully developed in the context of labor relations, 163 but
unlimited noncoercive speech would better inform the employee and
is consistent with general First Amendment speech protections.
B. Practical Impact of the Supreme Court's Decision in Brown on
Employer Speech Regarding Unionization
Over the last few decades, union membership has declined
drastically. 164 Organized labor blames this partly on the employers'
161. Kilberg & Schulp, supra note 110, at 212. As previously discussed, there
would likely be strong political challenges inherent in passing legislation to
undermine free debate over union organization. But this is briefly ignored in order
to consider the effect of passing such legislation.
162. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537-38 (1945) (citing Va. Elec. &
Power Co., 314 U.S. at 477) (holding that "'employers' attempts to persuade to
action with respect to joining or not joining unions are within the First
Amendment's guarantee.").
163. See Alan Story, Employer Speech, Union Representation Elections, and
The First Amendment, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 356, 366 (1995). When the
Supreme Court decided Thomas and Virginia Electric, certain First Amendment
concepts, such as restrictions on "time, place and manner," distinction between
political and commercial speech, concept of corporate speech, and different levels
of constitutional protection, developed in primitive forms. Id. at n.42. The silence
and confusion on these issues left by the Supreme Court's opinions may require a
re-examination of the First Amendment rights of employers. Id.
164. Over the past fifty years, union membership has declined in the United
States as a result of increased employer hostility and lack of remedies to deal with
that hostility. Specter & Nguyen, supra note 145, at 312. A decrease in union
membership greatly impacts society because unions "paved the way to the middle
class for millions, pioneering benefits such as paid pensions and health care"
Joseph Z. Fleming, The "Employee Free Choice Act": The House of Lords and the
House of Labor Have Something in Common: They Both are Seeking to Avoid
Secret Ballot Elections, ALI-ABA, Appendix B (Dec. 4-6, 2008). Unions
influence wages for both members and non-members, so as membership slides, so
does the union's ability to raise wages for their members. Id.
right to speak to employees prior to representation elections.
165
Unions are generally less effective in convincing employees to
recognize a particular union when the employer becomes involved
and provides information to the employee. 166 Organized labor has
supported initiatives at the state and federal level in an effort to place
limitations on the employers' speech rights. The Supreme Court's
decision in Brown, however, concluded that employers have the right
to noncoercive speech regarding unionization, and state legislation
preventing employers from speech that promotes or deters union
organization is preempted under the NLRA. Thus, as discussed in
Part V. A, most of organized labor's initiatives to place limitations on
the employers' speech rights through legislation will be preempted
by the NLRA. As a result, unions have begun looking at procedures
to diminish the importance of the employers' speech in an
employee's decision.
1. Current Opportunities for Employer Speech Regarding Union
Organization
Under the current version of the NLRA, the NLRB is required to
recognize a union as the employees' representative when it has been
"designated or selected" by employees.1 67 Once a union is contacted
by employees who feel unfairly treated in their place of employment,
the labor organizing campaign begins. 168 Throughout its campaign,
the union distributes authorization cards where the employees can
designate a particular union as their bargaining representative.169
Once the union has received authorized cards from a majority of
employees, it will request recognition from the employer as the
representative union and begin a collective bargaining relationship
with the employer. 170 The current practice is that employers will
generally decline the union's request and demand a representation
election. Once there is a question of representation or a suggestion
165. Specter & Nguyen, supra note 145, at 312.
166. Id. at 327.
167. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).
168. James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition:
Prospects for Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REv. 819, 824 (2005).
169. Id.
170. Id.
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that cards are an inaccurate indication of the employees' choice, the
employer files a petition with the NLRB seeking an election by secret
ballot to certify representation. 171 Courts have consistently upheld
the secret ballot as the standard and preferred method of selection. 
172
Insisting on a secret ballot election provides employers a
significant window of time to influence the employees' decision to
join a union and campaign against union organization prior to the
representative's designation. Thus, the primary criticisms or
problems with the NLRA's current process are that delays between
petitioning for and holding an election, unlimited employer free
speech rights, and a lack of sufficient penalties for unfair labor
practices allow employers to mount coercive anti-union campaigns
that undermine employees' free choice. Legally, employers are free
to hold "captive audience meetings" and communicate information
about the consequences of union organizing. 173  The NLRA does
limit the employer's ability to threaten employees, fire or
discriminate against those choosing to join the union, or promise
benefits to the employees in reward for rejecting the union.
However, there is an abundance of evidence showing that employers
regularly engage in both legal and illegal campaign tactics, which
generally result in a union loss by the time the secret ballot vote
arrives. 174
171. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c).
172. See Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 604 (Supreme Court held that an
employer is able to insist on a secret ballot election, unless the workplace
environment has been undermined to the point that a fair election is no longer
possible); Linden Lumber Div. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 310 (1974) (employers do
not have to recognize a union based solely on card checks and they can insist on a
secret ballot election without proving the cards do not correctly indicate the
employees' choice).
173. Captive audience speeches provide a forum for employers to express their
views on "union, political, and religious issues." Secunda, supra note 114, at 23.
This interferes with worker's rights because employees generally cannot "speak,
leave, or offer a rebuttal, without risking termination for insubordination." Id. This
tactic is highly effective and widely used by employers. The government recently
reported that ninety-two percent of union campaigns include captive audience
meetings, and the average campaign has up to eleven captive audience meetings.
Id.
174. See Specter & Nguyen, supra note 145, at 312.
2. Increased Support for Card Check Process
The use of card check procedures has been growing in the United
States as union membership conversely declines.' 75 The card check
process consists of employers agreeing to recognize a union based on
authorization cards signed by a majority of bargaining unit
workers.176 The union's ultimate goal is to obtain enough authorized
cards for voluntary recognition from the employer without the
necessity of a secret election. Generally, this process is agreed to by
employers and unions in conjunction with neutrality agreements.
Proponents argue that the card check process is desirable because
it diminishes the employer's opportunity to speak and launch anti-
union campaigns.' 77 Unions contend that the greater the amount of
employer communication during a campaign, the less likely a union
175. Raja Raghunath, Stacking the Deck: Privileging "Employer Free Choice"
Over Industrial Democracy in the Card-Check Debate, 87 NEB. L. REv. 329, 335
(2008). Originally, card check organizing campaigns were conducted in the private
sector pursuant to private agreements between unions and employers. Id.
However, since 2001, more states have enacted card check laws for their
employees through the use of neutrality agreements between unions and employers.
Id. In ninety percent of cases where a card check agreement is in place, the labor
union becomes the bargaining representative. See Joseph J. Fleming & Daniel B.
Pasternak, Mutuality Agreements: Innovative Approaches to the Use of Neutrality
Agreements- A Unique Proposal for Compromise, ALI-ABA. at 578 (Feb. 15-17,
2007).
176. See generally Sheila Murphy, Comment, A Comparison of the Selection
of Bargaining Representatives in the United States and Canada: Linden Lumber,
Gissel, and the Right to Challenge Minority Status, 10 COMP. LAB. L.J. 65, 81-96
(1988) (the Canadian model utilizes authorization cards to show majority support
and as an alternative to the United State's system of selecting a bargaining
representative).
177. Brudney, supra note 168, at 832. Neutrality and card check arrangements
give unions the opportunity to avoid anti-union campaigns, speech, and conduct.
Id. When an employee repeatedly hears that the employer does not approve of
unionization, the employee is bound to consider that joining the union may
adversely affect their work life, even if the employer's speech is noncoercive. Id.
In Canada statutes were enacted to limit the time available for employers and
unions to campaign prior to an election and implemented card check procedures in
some provinces to ease the process of unionization. Specter & Nguyen, supra note
145, at 326-27.
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is to prevail in the election.178 By establishing a card check process,
unions essentially make the employer agree to remain neutral and not
communicate to employees any indications as to how they feel
toward unionization. Additionally, because the process eliminates
the secret ballot election, the costs and risks of an organizing
campaign are decreased. 7 9
Unions gain a clear advantage in card check procedures because
(1) getting employees to sign authorization cards requires less effort
than campaigning prior to a secret ballot election, and (2) unions are
able to exert more influence over individual employees, as opposed
to all company employees prior to an election. 8 ° Opponents argue
that the card checks are conducted too quickly and eliminate the
employer's opportunity to state their opinions as to unionization.
181
Furthermore, the process replaces the secret ballot system, where
employees make their choice privately, with a process in which
employees are required to openly express their preference before
union organizers, coworkers, and even supervisors. 1
82
178. Brudney, supra note 168, at 832. The "aggressive and hierarchical nature
of employer communication" suggests an adverse impact on an election. Id.
179. Id.
180. Kilberg & Schulp, supra note 110, at 213.
181. Raghunath, supra note 174, at 337-38. The NLRB ruled in September
2007 that there be a forty-five day window period after a union is recognized via
the card check process during which employees can file a petition for a
decertification election. See Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. No. 28 (Sept. 2007), 2007
WL 2891099.
182. See Raghunath, supra note 174, at 337. While secret ballots are revered
in a democracy, there must be a democratic context in order for the elections to be
effective and meaningful. Id. Labor relations today involve intimidation during
elections, which makes the election run more as a "dictatorship than a functioning
democracy." Id. (quoting Strengthening America's Middle Class Through
Employee Free Choice Act: Hearing on H.R. 800 Before the Subcomm. on Health,
Employment, Labor and Pensions of the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 110th
Cong. 3-4 (2007)). Because the labor-management relationship is not generally a
democracy, a secret ballot is not necessarily the best indicator of employees'
choice.
3. Effect of Employee Free Choice Act on Employers' Speech
Rights
The linchpin of the card check process initiative is federal
legislation requiring the NLRB to replace the secret ballot election
process with card checks when union representation is in question.
In 2007, the Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) was introduced as
legislation amending the NLRA to require NLRB certification of a
bargaining representative if a majority of the bargaining unit
employees signed cards under a card check process.' 83 Under this
bill, a certified union can demand that an employer begin bargaining
with them within ten days of certification.' 84  The House of
Representatives passed the EFCA in March of 2007, but it failed to
pass in the Senate, and thus cannot be considered again in Congress
until 2009.185
The EFCA became a major issue during the 2008 presidential
campaign, and President Barack Obama and his current
administration have long supported the measure. 186 Unions support
the bill for the same reasons that they favor the card check procedure.
Organized labor believes that the current election process is tilted in
favor of employers because the "employer has all the power[,] ...
control[s] the information workers can receive[,] ... force[s] workers
to meet with supervisors [delivering] anti-union messages[, ... and.
. imply that business will close if the union wins."187 The bill gives
employees the opportunity to come together as a majority and know
that their decision will be certified immediately, without having to
endure coercive speech and brow beating by employers.
183. H.R. 800, 110th Cong. (2007).
184. Id.
185. Raghunath, supra note 174, at 337.
186. See 2007 CONG. REC. 153, S8378-S8398, S8390 (2007) (statement of
Sen. Obama of Illinois). Then Senator Obama supported this bill in 2007 because
the current process for organizing a workplace denies workers the right to organize
under a fair and free process. Id. While voluntary card check programs allow
employers to choose whether to accept the decision of a majority of workers, this
bill would leave that choice up to the workers and require the employer to
implement their decision.
187. See 2007 CONG. REC. 153, E260 (2007) (statement of Rep. Miller of
California).
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Those employers in opposition to the bill argue that the NLRA
was enacted to give American workers the right to cast a vote
privately as to whether or not they choose to organize.' 88 The card
check process would allow unions to bypass the secret ballot system
and eliminate the employees' democratic right to vote. 18 9 The
opposition also contends that the additional and required use of card
check procedures will lead to more coercion on the part of union
organizers, further eliminating the employees' free choice. 
190
While the purpose of the federal legislation is to diminish the
importance of employer speech to an employees' decision regarding
representation, the EFCA could potentially inhibit employee free
choice during the voting process in the same way that supporters
argue that employers currently inhibit free choice by launching anti-
union campaigns. History shows that the card check process
increases union membership; however, it may not always be the best
indicator of employees' desires because of inevitable motives on the
part of unions to coerce, intimidate, and manipulate a majority of
employees to authorize union certification. 1 91 Furthermore, while the
EFCA has the potential to force employers to certify unions based on
188. See Press Release, Committee on Education and Labor, Former Union
Organizer Details Tactics of "Manipulating Workers Just to Get a Majority on 'the
Cards"' (Feb. 8, 2007). Representative John Kline of Minnesota has stated that a
system where everyone knows how the employee voted not the best way to ensure
that the worker is free to choose. Id. A private ballot means no one will know how
the employee voted, thus a proposal to take away an employee's democratic right
to vote does not equal "employee free choice." Id.
189. See 2007 CONG. REC. 153, $8378-$8398, S8389 (2007) (statement of
Sen. McCain of Arizona).
190. See Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 602 (court held that cards do not
"accurately reflect an employee's wishes ... because the choice was the result of
group pressures and not individual decision made in the privacy of a voting booth.
[and] cards are too often obtained through misrepresentation and coercion which
compound the cards' inherent inferiority to the election process.").
191. See Meghan Brooke Phillips, Comment, Using the Employee Free Choice
Act as Duct Tape: How Both Active and Passive Deregulation of Labor Law Make
the EFCA an Improper Mechanism for Remedying Working Class Americans'
Problems, Ill W. VA. L. REV. 219, 260 (2008). For example, in a small town,
where there is one major employer, if an employee chose not to vote for
unionization, the entire town would know because the process is no longer secret.
Id. On the flip side, an employee may feel that if the employer knows that they
specifically voted for a union they will be treated different at work. Id. at 261.
a majority of cards, the legislation will not remove their inherent
motives to oppose unions. Employers could engage in more intense
monitoring systems to detect union organization earlier and
implement anti-union campaign tactics prior to the commencement of
an organizational effort. Thus, the proposed EFCA will essentially
act as a band-aid to solve the problems American workers are facing
in regard to employee free choice and union attempts to exert more
influence over employees and diminish the importance of employer
speech.
VI. CONCLUSION
Section 8(c) of the NLRA defends the idea that a free exchange
of ideas is the best mechanism for decision making, a principle
underlying economic markets and the long respected democratic
system. The Supreme Court's decision in Chamber of Commerce v.
Brown highlighted the NLRA's protection of free debate between
employers and organized labor on unionization. Recent union
initiatives to enact legislation and card check procedures in order to
silence employer speech during union campaigns show no signs of
abating. However, due to the Court's recent decision, legislation
restricting the use of state funds and prohibiting employer speech
prior to elections is preempted and unenforceable. Limiting
noncoercive employer speech deprives employees of valuable
information regarding the consequences of unionization, chilling one
side of the debate. The balance struck by the NLRA, and upheld in
the Supreme Court's decision, promotes employee free choice.
Protecting the freedom of both unions and employers to speak
ultimately provides the employee with all available information to
make an informed decision regarding unionization.
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